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 This study investigated how children and adolescents make sense of transgressive 
experiences in which they assume versus mitigate blame for causing harm. Specifically, 
the present study focused on how children of various ages constructed different aspects of 
their moral agency (i.e., one sense-making process) with assumption and mitigation. 
Participants (N = 120; 5-, 9-, and 16-year-olds) provided accounts of their own 
transgressive experiences in which they assumed blame and mitigated blame for hurting a 
peer. Narratives were coded for two features theorized to be implicated in the 
construction of moral agency: various types of reasons and explanations used to explain 
harmful behavior, and feelings of guilt. With assumption of fault, 5-year-olds constructed 
accounts without making reference to any reasons or explanations; with mitigation of 
fault, they described situations in which their peers hurt themselves or were hurt by 
others. By contrast, 9- and 16-year-olds referenced not self-monitoring with assumption 
of fault; they discussed how their peers misconstrued their intentions with mitigation of 
fault. In all, findings suggest that children and adolescents are learning about different 
aspects of their moral agency in experiences in which they assume and mitigate blame.   
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Everyday transgressive experiences are important contexts in which children 
develop their sense of themselves as moral agents, in part because doing harm presents a 
tension between their hurtful actions and their sense of themselves as “good” people 
(Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a; Wainryb, 2011; Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005). When 
children act in ways that end up hurting others, they can reflect on their behavior, their 
reasons for engaging in the act, their guilt over causing harm, and the extent to which 
their actions were morally wrong. Extant research on moral development has taken it for 
granted that people should assume responsibility for their harmful actions; the mitigation 
of responsibility has been characterized as defensive, self-protective, or as consistent with 
moral disengagement (Bandura, 2002; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). 
However, recent evidence suggests that people may be attuned to what their actions and 
experiences show about their moral agency even when they mitigate responsibility for 
their wrongdoings (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b; Recchia, Brehl, & Wainryb, 2012; 
Wainryb et al., 2005; Wainryb, Komolova, & Brehl, 2011). For example, when 
accounting for their transgressive behavior, children reference their hurtful actions and at 
the same time they sometimes mention that they believe the harm was necessary, their 
reasons were benevolent, or there were extenuating circumstances. Given that children 
might make sense of their behavior (e.g., explain why they engaged in the act) differently 





for causing harm, it may be that these two types of transgressive experiences make 
distinct contributions to children’s developing sense of moral agency, as defined by the 
moral developmental perspective. This perspective—which is the one that we take in the 
present study—refers to moral agency as people’s understanding of the relationship 
between their morally relevant actions (e.g., those that cause harm) and their 
psychological experience, such as their goals, beliefs, and emotions (see Pasupathi & 
Wainryb, 2010a). 
Yet, no research has examined how children and adolescents construct their own 
moral agency in experiences in which they assume and mitigate responsibility for their 
wrongdoings. This reflection can take place in many ways, but in this study, we focus on 
the way such reflection is evident in children’s narrative accounts (McLean, Pasupathi, & 
Pals, 2007). Specifically, our primary purpose in the present study was to examine the 
differences in how children and adolescents construct their moral agency in accounts of 
experiences in which they assume blame for causing harm and in experiences in which 
they mitigate blame for causing harm.  
The reasons that people provide to explain why they caused harm (e.g., their 
intentions) have long been considered critical to moral understanding. More specific to 
the present study, the type of reason that children reference to explain why they engaged 
in behavior that ended up hurting others is likely to differ with assumption and mitigation 
of fault. For instance, the reasons that children provide to explain their wrongdoings in 
situations in which they assume fault for causing harm might more directly link their 
harmful actions and aspects of themselves, such as their own intentions, goals, beliefs, 





explanations that children provide to explain their harmful behavior can be less directly 
connected to themselves, but still might promote their agency; these types of reasons 
might occur more frequently with mitigation of blame. For example, children might refer 
to situational constraints to explain why they engaged in a behavior that caused harm 
(e.g., “I kept not throwing the ball to her because I couldn’t see her standing behind 
another kid”). These second types of reasons—those that stem from the self less 
directly—might also contribute to moral development because it is important that 
children learn the limits or outer-boundaries of their moral agency. In addition to making 
sense of more straightforward instances of harming (e.g., those in which harm was caused 
intentionally), children also need to reason about transgressive experiences caused by 
accidents, about those in which their interpretations differ from those of others, about 
times that goals come into conflict, and experiences in which short-term harm is 
necessary for long-term gains. Given that reasons and explanations are implicated in the 
construction of moral agency (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b), and that children’s reasons 
for their behavior might differ with experiences of assumption and mitigation of blame, 
these two experiences might both contribute, albeit differently, to the development of 
moral agency. 
To address this claim, we examined children’s narrative accounts of two 
transgressive events (those in which they assume blame and those in which they mitigate 
blame for causing harm) to find the types of reasons, explanations, and emotions that 
children provided to explain their harmful behavior. We also documented the types of 





harmful behavior as wrong to learn about the context in which their reasons and feelings 
were referenced.  
The second, related purpose of the present study was to examine whether the 
differences (in types of reasons and guilt) between experiences of assumption and 
mitigation of fault varied for children and adolescents of different ages. Children’s 
cognitive, social-cognitive, emotional, and narrative abilities change with development; 
older children’s and adolescents’ more sophisticated abilities are often used to integrate 
their harmful actions with their sense of themselves as moral people (Wainryb & Brehl, 
2006). Specific to the present study, we expected that developments in these abilities 
would be implicated as children constructed their moral agency with assumption or 
mitigation of blame. For example, older children and adolescents might judge their 
harmful actions quite differently in these two types of transgressive experiences (more 
negatively with assumption, less negatively with mitigation) due to their ability to 
consider multiple facets of an experience simultaneously, whereas younger children 
might judge their actions equally negatively in both contexts due to cognitive limitations. 
We included a broad age range (5 to 16 years) to capture how children construct their 
moral agency differently with assumption and mitigation at distinct developmental 
periods.  
Therefore, this study asks how do children and adolescents of various ages 
construct their moral agency differently (via references to various types of reasons and 







Experiences of assumption and mitigation of blame might  
distinctly contribute to the construction of moral agency 
 All children will inevitably act in ways that end up hurting others. In some 
experiences, children might know (or at least suspect) that their behavior will end up 
causing harm before they engage in it—this includes both instances in which they intend 
to cause harm and those in which the harm is incidental to their pursuit of other goals. In 
other transgressions, the harm might be unanticipated; children might not recognize the 
harm that they caused until after the fact or until others tell them that their actions were 
hurtful. And in yet other transgressive experiences, children might view their actions as 
less authentically theirs, such as in instances with external constraints, in those in which 
their actions were accidental, or those in which they struggled to regulate their impulses. 
In some of these scenarios, it might be appropriate for those who caused harm to assume 
full responsibility for their behavior. However, it might also be appropriate—and crucial 
to the development of moral agency—for children to sometimes mitigate the extent to 
which their transgressions were their fault. When children mitigate fault for causing 
harm, they may be presenting what actually happened (or what they think happened) in 
their experiences (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a), instead of constructing self-protective 
distortions (Baumeister et al., 1990). Though we agree that assuming fault for 
wrongdoings is, in many instances, important to the development of moral agency, we 
think that always assuming fault or only being able to assume fault for causing harm is 
likely to be maladaptive. 
 Harming others is an inevitable part of social life, and at times, children harm 





suspect that while it is important that children learn to acknowledge their own 
wrongdoings—particularly the aspects of their interactions that are legitimately under 
their own control or stem more directly from themselves—it is also important that 
children construct an understanding that there are limits to their own (and others’) moral 
agency. By this we mean that children also need to recognize the aspects of an experience 
that are less under their control. In addition, they need to provide room for other people to 
act as moral agents, with thoughts, feelings, and desires of their own. Therefore, we 
expect that children’s transgressive experiences of assumption and mitigation of blame 
provide them with distinct contexts in which they can elaborate various aspects of their 
agency, and ultimately, further a more adaptive view of themselves as moral beings. In 
short, an adaptive sense of moral agency must fit with children’s various complex and 
multifaceted experiences, must be able to incorporate mistakes and missteps, must allow 
for forgiveness of self and others, and must promote future moral development 
(Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a). 
Before hypothesizing about how experiences of assumption and mitigation of 
blame might uniquely contribute to children’s sense of themselves as moral agents, it is 
important to note that one conceptualization of moral agency contends that people do not 
construct their moral agency with mitigation of blame.  
 
Two perspectives on moral agency 
 
People’s understandings of how their own morally relevant actions relate to 
themselves have been the focus of work on moral agency. Two distinct, yet related, 
conceptualizations of moral agency have been put forth by researchers: the agency as 





“agency as control” perspective examine the extent to which people perceive that they 
have more or less autonomy or control over their behavior (e.g., Little, Snyder, & 
Wehmeyer, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In this paradigm, actions are often classified on a 
continuum that ranges from fully autonomous and self-chosen (high agency) to externally 
constrained (low or diminished agency; Adler, 2012). The majority of work in the agency 
as control perspective has examined people’s agency in nonmoral domains (e.g., 
academic performance), but the agency as control conception has also been applied to 
morally relevant behaviors (i.e., pertaining to the welfare or justice of people). 
Specifically, the agency as control position has been used in moral disengagement 
theory to argue that people are disengaged from their agency in experiences in which they 
harm others. Moral disengagement theory proposes that people typically engage in 
actions that hurt others only after they have convinced themselves that those actions are 
justified. People either rationalize to themselves that their behavior is not actually 
harmful or they minimize or distort the relation between themselves and their behavior 
(e.g., they acted only because a person in authority mandated it). Further, since people do 
not see their harmful actions as stemming from themselves, they are spared feelings of 
guilt or remorse for causing harm (Bandura, 2002). Thus, implicit in moral 
disengagement theory is the assumption that people always mitigate responsibility for 
their wrongdoings; that is, this theory does not consider that in some experiences people 
might assume blame for the harm that ensued from their actions. Since this perspective 
holds that moral agency is not constructed in experiences in which people cause harm, 





Using the agency as control perspective generally, and moral disengagement 
theory specifically, we could attempt to address the present study’s research question. 
Recall that we ask: What are the ways in which experiences of assumption and mitigation 
of fault offer distinct contributions to children’s sense of themselves as moral agents? In 
other words, which types of reasons and explanations are referenced with each type of 
transgressive experience? The agency as control perspective would allow us to ask: To 
what extent do children perceive that they had control over their actions in experiences in 
which they assume blame? This question is not the same as ours; an examination of the 
extent to which children perceive that they have control over their actions cannot reveal 
the various types of reasons and explanations that children provide to make sense of their 
harmful actions. A second problem that we encounter with the agency as control 
perspective has to do with mitigation of fault. Moral disengagement theory argues that 
people are disengaged from their own moral agency with mitigation; thus, we could not 
ask how moral agency is constructed in this context. Due to these limitations, the moral 
developmental perspective is used in the present study.  
Instead of focusing on the extent of (or disengagement from) people’s sense of 
their moral agency, those working from the “moral developmental” perspective, examine 
how people might construct ‘less’ moral agency in qualitatively distinct ways (Pasupathi 
& Wainryb, 2010a). As noted, this perspective defines moral agency as the type of 
association that is formed between people’s morally relevant actions and beliefs, desires, 
emotions, and situational features. In contrast with the dearth of empirical work on moral 
transgressions in the agency as control tradition, there is a growing body of work in the 





transgressive experiences. In fact, the moral developmental perspective argues that 
experiences in which people transgress are key contexts for the development of moral 
agency. Because doing harm challenges people’s sense of themselves as moral beings, 
people reflect on the ways in which their hurtful behavior did and did not stem from 
themselves; through this reflection, they construct more elaborate understandings of their 
own moral agency (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a). For example, in narrative accounts of 
their own experiences, children connect their own harmful actions to a variety of aspects 
of their experiences, both to those that are internal to themselves (e.g., their intentions, 
goals, beliefs, emotions) and to those that are external to themselves (e.g., situational 
constraints, their inability to know others’ thoughts or desires; Recchia et al., 2013; 
Wainryb et al., 2005). 
Although much work is emerging in the moral developmental perspective on how 
children construct their moral agency in their transgressive experiences, no work has yet 
addressed how children might make sense of their harmful actions differently in 
situations when they assume and mitigate fault for causing harm. Nevertheless, the moral 
developmental perspective will be used to guide our understanding of moral agency. 
Conceptually, this perspective allows for moral agency to co-occur with transgressive 
experiences, even in those in which fault is mitigated. From the moral developmental 
framework, we can ask whether (and if so, how) different aspects of children moral 
agency are constructed with assumption and mitigation of fault. More specifically, what 
particular types of reasons and explanations are referenced in accounts in which they 
assume blame, and are these the same as the particular types of reasons and explanations 





Aspects of moral agency that might differ with  
 
mitigation and assumption of blame 
 
Through examinations of children’s narrative accounts of their own transgressive 
actions, moral developmental researchers have identified many elements that contribute 
to children’s moral agency, such as children’s various reasons for causing harm (e.g., 
peer pressure, various intentions, pursuit of an instrumental goal, misunderstandings, 
provocation), their own emotions about their wrongdoing (e.g., guilt, anger), how the 
victim’s perspective conflicted with their own (e.g., the victim’s differing cognitions or 
desires), the harmful consequences of their actions (e.g., to their victims, to themselves, 
to their relationships), as well as other features that have been conceptually linked to the 
construction of moral agency (e.g., Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b; Recchia et al., 2013; 
Wainryb et al., 2005, 2011). Some of these features might be particularly important to the 
construction of moral agency in experiences in which children assume or mitigate fault 
for causing harm. 
Moral development researchers have long emphasized the importance of 
intentions and emotions. By the age of 5, most children can distinguish between 
intentional and accidental transgressions when they are not confounded with information 
about consequences (Darley, Klosson, & Zanna, 1978). Prior work has found that people, 
including children, assign more blame to people when they cause harm intentionally, as 
compared to when the harm was unintended or accidental (Darley & Shultz, 1990; Malle, 
Guglielmo, & Monroe; 2012). However, it might not be that intentional harm is always 
paired with the assumption of fault and unintentional harm is always paired with the 





situations involving intentional harm, people attend to the agents’ reasons for acting—if 
agents provide adequate justification for causing intentional harm, then their actions are 
judged to be less blameworthy. In scenarios involving unintentional harm, people also 
consider the agents’ reasons for engaging in the behavior, in addition to considering what 
caused the unintentional actions to occur, and whether the actors should have or could 
have prevented the harm from occurring (Malle et al., 2012).  
Although much of the moral development literature has discussed intentional 
versus accidental harming, children often describe their own transgressive behaviors as 
not quite intentional-not quite unintentional (Wainryb et al, 2005). So, in addition to 
reflecting on their own intentions—or in lieu of considering information about their 
intentions at all—children might consider other types of justifications to explain their 
behavior in experiences in which they caused harm and assume or mitigate blame. For 
example, research suggests that children might refer to personal, social-conventional, or 
competing moral concerns to mitigate fault for causing harm.  
Work in the domain-specific tradition has shown that children, beginning at a 
young age, construct knowledge about different social domains through their interactions 
with others and reflections on these social interactions. Moral concepts are constructed 
through, and brought to bear on, experiences that involve the well-being or fair treatment 
of others (e.g., causing or preventing harm); social-conventional concepts are brought to 
bear on situation-specific agreed upon ways of interacting (e.g., rules or customs); and 
personal concepts are applied to experiences that involve personal preferences or 
autonomy (e.g., desires; Turiel, 1998; Nucci, 1981). Recent social domain theory work 





situations with competing concerns or those from multiple domains. For instance, in one 
study, children and adolescents were presented three hypothetical scenarios: in one 
scenario, a child acts in a way that harms another because she wants to play a different 
game (moral concerns competing with personal concerns); in another scenario, a child 
acts in a way that harms another because the teaching assistant asks him to play with 
another child (moral and conventional); and in the third scenario, a child acts in a way 
that harms another because she is trying to help someone else (moral and moral). After 
children were presented with each scenario, they were asked to rate how much the child 
who caused the harm was to blame. Across all three scenarios, children generally rated 
the actor as deserving no blame at all or medium/mixed levels of blame; however, 
children were twice as likely to say that the actor was to be blamed in the scenario with 
personal concerns as compared to the other two types of scenarios (Brehl, 2008). 
Although these findings were with hypothetical scenarios, it might be that in their own 
experiences, children often mitigate fault for causing harm by referencing conventional or 
situational features (e.g., rules, authority dictates) or competing moral concerns (e.g., 
trying to actually help the victim or another person) to explain their hurtful behavior. 
Evidence is less clear about whether incidental reasons such as personal concerns will be 
referenced in situations in which children mitigate or assume fault for hurting others, but 
we expect personal concerns will be referred to more often with mitigation of fault.  
In addition to referring to different types of reasons and explanations, children 
might bring their moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame) to bear on the construction of moral 
agency (Wainryb et al., 2005) with assumption and mitigation of fault. Theorists propose 





own actions are responsible for the hurt” (Hoffman, 1984, p. 289). Therefore, it is likely 
that children will experience guilt more frequently with the assumption of fault for 
causing harm. Though guilt has been shown to be critical to children’s moral 
development, evidence shows that there is an “over arousal effect” that limits people’s 
ability to process situational features and appropriately respond to another’s distress; 
thus, there might be an optimal range of empathetic arousal (Hoffman, 1984; Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Furthermore, the absence of guilt for causing harm in some 
experiences is not necessarily maladaptive, but rather, it might reflect people’s complex 
understandings of situations in which their legitimate motives and intentions come into 
conflict with other’s goals (Wainryb & Recchia, 2013).  
Relatedly, research has shown that sometimes children construct accounts of their 
transgressions without making any reference to their reasons or explanations for their 
harmful actions. Children might be particularly likely to construct these “numb” or 
“opaque” accounts to avoid overwhelming feelings of anger or guilt (Wainryb, 2011). For 
example, in accounts of situations in which they caused severe harm to others, children 
sometimes do not represent, or only minimally represent, their own internal experiences. 
In these types of accounts, children refer to the facts of what happened, but they do not 
elaborate on why they engaged in the hurtful behavior or whether the victim 
misunderstood their behavior. Given that children might be more hyper-aroused by their 
own moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame) in transgressive experiences in which they 






Along with these hypothesized differences, we expect that there will be some 
similarities between experiences of assumption and mitigation of fault. Specifically, 
children might reference similar types of harmful actions and make comparable 
judgments about the wrongness of those actions with both transgressive contexts. Prior 
work shows that children reference many different types of harmful behavior, such as 
actions that are more observable and concrete (e.g., physical harm, disputes about sharing 
toys) and those that are more psychological in nature (e.g., breaking a promise; Wainryb 
et al., 2005). Previous research has also shown that children tend to judge their own 
harmful actions negatively (i.e., as not okay) or as simultaneously negative and positive 
(Wainryb et al., 2005). The present study aimed to document the types of behavior and 
judgments that children made with assumption and mitigation of blame to find whether 
these aspects of moral agency construction were similar with assumption and mitigation 
of fault, and to document the contexts in which children were constructing different 
aspects of their moral agency (via reasons and explanations and guilt).  
 
Age-related differences and the construction of moral agency 
  
with assumption and mitigation of blame 
 
The research reviewed above suggests that children and adolescents might make 
sense of their transgressive behavior in distinct ways in experiences in which they assume 
and mitigate blame for their wrongdoings. In particular, the features that we expect will 
vary between assumption and mitigation are the types of reasons and explanations 
provided to explain their behavior and whether they refer to feeling guilt for causing 
harm. Moreover, there is evidence that children and adolescents at various developmental 





The cognitive capacities linked to narrative construction (e.g., verbal ability, 
memory, executive function; Keil, 2006), social-cognitive and theory-of-mind abilities 
(Chadler & Lalonde, 1996), and children’s ability to elaborate on their own experiences 
(Reese, Yan, Jack, & Hayne, 2010) increase significantly between early and middle 
childhood. Further, between late childhood and adolescence, children’s capacity to draw 
meaning from their experiences shows marked development (McLean, Breen, & 
Fournier, 2010). These developmental changes have been linked to children constructing 
more elaborated accounts of their own transgressions between the ages of 5 and 16, as 
well as accounts that are more likely to reference psychological features, such as reasons 
and emotions (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b; Wainryb et al., 2005). However, how these 
age-related changes are associated with the assumption and mitigation of fault is not 
known. Nevertheless, hypotheses can be formed from relevant work.  
As previously mentioned, children as young as 5 years old can distinguish 
between accidental and intentional harm, and they judge intentional harm to be more 
wrong. However, this is only when information about consequences is not confounded 
with information about intentions. In their accounts of transgressing, young children 
sometimes refer to their intentions (in 54% of narratives), and sometimes refer to the 
victim’s emotions (in 46% of narratives; Wainryb et al., 2005). When young children 
were asked to make judgments of their transgressive behavior, they judged them 
negatively, presumably because they attended almost exclusively to the harmful 
consequences of those actions (Wainryb et al., 2005). By contrast, older children and 
adolescents could integrate both their reasons for their actions and the harmful 





young children might focus more exclusively on either their harmful action or on their 
intentions with assumption and mitigation. We suspect that children will more 
exclusively attend to the harmful action in accounts of assumption of fault, and this 
singular focus might be associated with not referencing any type of reason or explanation 
for causing harm. In other words, with assumption, they might be more likely to construct 
numb accounts of experiences in which they transgress than they do in accounts of 
mitigation. It is unknown what types of reasons and explanations young children might 
reference to explain their behavior in experiences in which they mitigate fault for causing 
harm.  
Older children and adolescents can construct more complex understandings of 
their transgressive experiences, taking into account many features simultaneously. Given 
that older children and adolescents more often attend to psychological features of their 
transgressive experiences, variations in the types of internal features that they consider 
might be related to how they construct distinct aspects their moral agency with 
assumption and mitigation. First, there is evidence that in accounts of their 
transgressions, children and adolescents refer to their victim’s cognitions more frequently 
with age (Recchia, et al., 2013). More specific to the present study, we expect that older 
children and adolescents will likely refer to victim’s cognitions more frequently with the 
mitigation of fault, namely by referring to the victim misunderstanding their intentions or 
misinterpreting what was happening. Also, based on the finding that adults consider 
whether the actor could have acted differently to assign blame (Malle, 2012), and 
children’s increasingly ability to self regulate with age (Eisenberg et al., 1997), we 





of their wrongdoings. However, we are uncertain whether referring to not self-monitoring 
will occur more frequently with assumption or mitigation of fault—children might 
reference not self-monitoring to mitigate fault (“I wasn’t paying attention, so it was not 
my fault that he got hurt”), or they may do so to assume fault (“I wasn’t paying attention, 
so it was my fault that he got hurt”).  
 
The current study 
 
In this study, we collected transgression narratives from 5-, 9-, and 16-year-olds 
who were asked to produce one narrative about an instance that they assume 
responsibility for causing harm and one narrative about an instance that they mitigate 
responsibility for causing harm. We coded the narratives for the presence of references to 
various types of harmful behavior, to various types of reasons and explanations, and to 
guilt; we then asked children to judge their harmful behavior as okay (positive) or not 
okay (negative).  
In summary, we hypothesized that in their accounts in which they assumed 
responsibility, children would be more likely to reference intending to harm the victim, to 
not provide any reasons and explanations for their behavior (i.e., construct numb 
accounts), and to reference guilt for their behavior. We hypothesized that in accounts in 
which children mitigate responsibility for causing harm, they would be more likely to 
reference unintentional harm, benevolent intentions (i.e., moral reasons for causing 
harm), situational constraints (e.g., rules, authority dictates), and incidental reasons (e.g., 
personal concerns).  
Although we expected numb constructions would be occur more frequently with 





to construct numb accounts more often than older children and adolescents with 
assumption of fault. In other words, older children and adolescents were expected to 
often provide distinct reasons and explanations to construct their moral agency differently 
with assumption and mitigation, whereas younger children might often provide reasons 
and explanations with their mitigation accounts and make no reference to reasons or 
explanations with assumption of fault. Younger children were expected to equally 
infrequently refer to the victim’s misconstrual with assumption and mitigation of fault, 
whereas adolescents are expected to refer to victim’s misconstrual more often with 
mitigation than with assumption of blame. We expected that older children and 
adolescents would refer to not self-monitoring more frequently than younger children, but 
we were uncertain about whether this type of explanation would be more frequent with 
assumption or mitigation. Overall, by examining children’s own explanations and 
emotions about their behavior in experiences in which they assume or mitigate fault, this 
study has the potential to further our understanding of how children might construct 







Participants and procedure 
 
  Children were recruited in a midsized city in the western United States in 
schools, community centers, and through word of mouth. The final sample included 120 
participants in three age groups: 40 5-year-olds (M age = 5-8, range = 4-11 to 6-9), 40 9-
year-olds (M age = 9-7, range = 9-0 to 10-10), and 40 16-year-olds (M age = 16-2, range 
= 15-2 to 17-3). Each age group included equal numbers of boys and girls. Two 
additional participants (a 9-year-old boy and 5-year-old girl) were excluded because they 
could not think of a time that they upset or hurt a peer. The sample was primarily 
European American (72%), with the remaining children representing a variety of 
ethnicities: African American (3%), Asian (2%), Hispanic and/or Latino/a (8%), and 
mixed descent (9%). Seven percent of parents chose to not disclose their child’s ethnicity. 
Written parental permission and child assent were provided for all participants.  
 Each child was interviewed individually in a private setting in the child’s school, 
home, or community center. Two narrative accounts were elicited from each participant: 
(1) one about a situation in which the child assumes fault for causing harm to a peer, and 
(2) one about another situation in which the child mitigates fault for causing harm to a 
peer. The order of elicitation of the assume and mitigate narratives was counterbalanced 
by age and gender. To help children recall appropriate events, cards picturing four 





transgression card were used. Each transgression card depicted one type of harmful 
action: an offensive behavior, a physical behavior, a trust violation, a property dispute, or 
a general nonspecific transgression. After the transgression cards were presented, 
children were asked to think of a recent, important time when “you did or said something 
like what’s on these cards…and another kid ended up upset or hurt, and you think it was 
(not) your fault.” If children nominated a generic or recurrent event, they were asked to 
provide an account of one specific episode.  
The narrative elicitation prompts were deliberately worded in a passive voice 
since research has shown that children use passive language when they discuss their 
transgressions in natural settings (Sedlak & Walton, 1982). Further, as participants 
narrated each event, the interviewer encouraged speaking by using general active-
listening prompts (“uh huh…”) and by repeating phrases of the narrative verbatim (“and 
then she told you to not pass the note…”). These procedures have encouraged disclosure 
of transgressions in previous interviews (Wainryb et al., 2005).  
After children appeared to be finished narrating each event, they were asked, “Is 
there anything else you can tell me about that time?” Next, they were asked, “Can you 
tell me a little more about how you think that what happened was (not) your fault?” After 
verifying with children that they had nothing more to add, the interviewer asked a 
manipulation check question to assess whether the child had understood what type of 
event they had been asked to narrate (“This time, did I ask you to tell me about a time 
that you think it was your fault or about a time that you think it was not your fault?”). The 






Following the elicitation of both narratives, participants were asked to consider 
the first event that they had narrated and to evaluate the negativity of their harmful 
behavior (“Do you think it was okay or not okay that you…?”) and to choose the extent 
to which it was (not) okay (“Was it really (not) okay or just kind of (not) okay?”). 
Answers formed a 5-point scale (1 = really not okay; 2 = kind of not okay, 3 = 
mixed/both; 4 = kind of okay; 5 = really okay). Finally, participants were asked to 
consider the second event that they had narrated and to evaluate their actions. Interviews 





 The coding of narrative elements was adapted based on previous similar studies 
(Recchia et al., 2012, 2013; Wainryb et al., 2005) and elaborated based on the coding of 
10% of the data. Interrater reliability was established between the author and a naïve 
coder on 20% of the narratives. Disagreements were resolved via discussion and 




Each narrative was divided into clauses, with one subject-verb group per line. The 




After each event was narrated, children were asked to remind the interviewer 
whether they had just been asked to provide a “fault” or “not fault” account. Children’s 





5-year-olds sometimes failed the manipulation check (26% of their narratives), whereas 
than 9- and 16-year-olds almost never failed the manipulation check (less than 1% of 
their narratives). It is important to note that all 5-year-olds began their accounts with an 
understanding of the manipulation (e.g., they began their mitigation accounts saying that 
the incidence was not their fault), but they did not correctly recall the initial instructions 
at the end of their narration. We think that this is an important part of the phenomenon 
rather than a manipulation failure—this finding suggests that for some 5-year-olds, 
experiences of assumption and mitigation are less clearly distinguished. Children in this 
youngest age group passed the manipulation check equally frequently with assumption 




Types of harmful behavior 
Each narrative was coded for the presence of six types of harmful behaviors 
(kappa = .73): (a) harm resulting from the victim’s blocked goal (e.g., not letting the 
victim be “it” during tag), (b) harm resulting from excluding the victim or psychological 
separation (e.g., not inviting the victim to a party; ignoring the victim), (c) harm resulting 
from offensive behavior (e.g., name calling), (d) physical harm, (e) property-related harm 
(e.g., refusing to share), and (f) harm resulting from a trust violation (e.g., breaking a 
promise). Since these six codes were not mutually exclusive, after coding was completed, 
we summed the types of harmful behavior codes to get descriptive information about how 
frequently children referred to more than one type of harmful behavior; scores could 






Types of reasons and explanations 
 
Each narrative was coded for the presence of seven types of reasons and 
explanations for the harmful behavior: (a) intending the harmful consequences to the 
victim or foreseeing the harm (i.e., the harm was caused on purpose or it was foreseen), 
(b) not intending the harmful consequences to the victim (e.g., accidental harm), (c) 
benevolent intentions (i.e., prosocial intent), (d) incidental reasons for engaging in the 
harmful behavior (e.g., personal rights, prescriptive beliefs, desires, thoughts), (e) not 
self-monitoring or not having self-control (e.g., being careless, overreacting), (f) external 
or situational constraints (e.g., rule violations, authority dictates, weather), and (g) 
victim’s misconstrual of the experience (i.e., misunderstanding on the victim’s part). 
These seven codes were not mutually exclusive, so after coding was completed, we 
summed the types of reasons/explanation codes to get descriptive information about how 
frequently children referred to more than one type of reason/explanation; scores could 
range from 1 to 7. In this study, we had formed hypotheses about the presence of each 
type of reason or explanation; we did not form hypotheses about the number of different 
types of reasons presented, or in whether particular reasons and explanations frequently 
co-occurred. 
There were a number of narratives that did not contain explicit mention of 
reasons. Each of these narratives was coded into one of three categories: (h) numb 
construction (i.e., the narrator references that he/she caused harm, but does not provide 
reasons or explanations for the action), (i) victim hurt self or a third party hurt the victim 
(i.e., the victim hurt herself/himself—in a way other than misconstruing—or some other 





construction (i.e., there was no harmful behavior to explain or the narrative was 
incomprehensible). Based on previous research (Wainryb, 2011; Wainryb et al., 2010; 
Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2010), we had anticipated that children might fail to reference 
their reasons for engaging in the harmful behavior (i.e., form a numb account); we did not 
anticipate a priori that children might have difficulties considering their actions, the 
outcome of those actions, and their blameworthiness simultaneously. During coding 
scheme development, we noticed that young children sometimes narrated experiences 
that met only two of the three criteria, which were to tell about a time “(1) when you did 
something, (2) someone ended up upset, and (3) you think that it was (not) your fault”. 
Specifically, a group of accounts provided by 5-year-olds left out the “when you did 
something” criteria. In these accounts, either the victim hurt himself or a person other 
than the narrator hurt the victim. Consider the following example of a narrative coded as 
“victim hurt self”; all capitals signals that the interviewer was speaking; and where 
indicated, the narrative was edited for length: 
CAN YOU THINK OF A TIME LIKE THAT (i.e., like the behaviors illustrated 
on the transgression cards), WHEN YOU DID OR SAID SOMETHING (pause) 
ANOTHER KID ENDED UP UPSET OR HURT (pause) AND IT WAS NOT 
YOUR FAULT? Umm. One time I like, um, hit someone by throwing a book. 
AND WAS THAT A TIME THAT IT WAS YOUR FAULT OR WAS NOT 
YOUR FAULT? Was my fault. OK, WE'LL TALK ABOUT THAT TIME IN A 
MINUTE, BUT FOR NOW (emphasized “now”), LETS THINK OF A TIME 
WHEN IT WAS NOT YOUR FAULT. Mmm. (long pause) CAN YOU THINK 
OF A TIME WHEN YOU DID OR SAID SOMETHING, ANOTHER KID 
ENDED UP UPSET OR HURT, AND IT WAS NOT YOUR FAULT? Me and 
my friend Sunny, one of her, her horses bucked her off […] UH HUH. WAS 
THAT A TIME WHEN YOU DID OR SAID SOMETHING, AND ANOTHER 
PERSON ENDED UP UPSET OR HURT? AND IT WAS NOT YOUR FAULT? 
It wasn't my fault. IT WASN'T YOUR FAULT? (pause) BUT DID YOU DO OR 
SAY ANYTHING?  (long pause) WERE YOU THERE THAT TIME? No, my, 
my friend Sunny was somewhere else, but she just comes here to visit. MM 
HMM. CAN YOU THINK OF A TIME WHEN YOU (emphasized “you”) DID 





punching me in the eyeball once. WHAT WAS THAT? One of my friends 
punched me in the eyeball once […] AND DID THAT FRIEND GET UPSET, 
TOO? Mmm, no. (pause) SO WHO WAS UPSET THAT TIME? Um, I think I 
was. One time Cole got upset. IS THAT A TIME WHEN YOU DID OR SAID 
SOMETHING, COLE GOT UPSET OR HURT, AND IT WAS NOT YOUR 
FAULT? (pause) Ummmmm…one of my friends punched him in the stomach 
[…] (6-year-old boy).   
 
Even after the interviewer repeatedly reminded the participant what the three criteria 
were, he could not think of an incidence from his own life that fit the prompt’s 3 criteria. 
We decided against replacing the children who produced these “victim hurt self” 
accounts because these very same children provided accounts with the other event type 
(i.e., with assumption) that fit all three criteria.  
The other code that we did not anticipate a priori was “fragmented”—that is, 
when children provided accounts that were off topic or were too incoherent to code. Only 
children in the youngest age group constructed fragmented accounts (15% of their 
assume accounts and 10% of their mitigate accounts were fragmented); thus, we did not 
include the fragmented code in our analyses. 
Cohen’s kappa for the 10 types of reasons and explanations was .65. Examples of 
these codes are provided in Table 1. In some narratives, children referenced reasons that 
did not fit into any of the above categories (e.g., being provoked). These narratives were 
marked as having an “other” type of reason and were not included in analyses. Four 




Each narrative was coded for the presence of guilt (kappa = .51).  This code was 





shame, regret, remorse, or a nonspecific negative emotion (e.g., “I felt bad about it”). An 
example of a reference to guilt is provided in Table 1. 
 
Judgments of harmful behavior 
 
Children were explicitly asked to evaluate their harmful behavior as “okay or not 
okay”. Responses formed a 5-point scale: 1-really negative (really not okay), 2-kind of 
negative (kind of not okay), 3-mixed (the act was both okay and not okay), 4- kind of 

























Examples of categories used for coding the types of each narrative element 
 
Narrative elements,  
and their types 
 
Examples 
Harmful behavior  
 Blocked goal There is this game we play where one person is the boss 
over the other one. He wanted to be the boss, but I 
wouldn’t let him. 
   
 Excluding We all came from our hotel rooms and decided to play 
capture the flag on the field. After a while, we realized 
that we were missing one girl, so went to her room and 
she was crying because she felt like we had left her out. 
   
 Offensive behavior We all skateboarded a lot. We would say, “he sucked” and 
stuff like that. Yeah, and it kind of hurt him.  
   
 Physical We were playing and we bonked our heads and tripped 
over each other. We both got upset and hurt and got sent 
to timeout. 
   
 Property-related I took his cards without asking, and he’s like, “give ’em 
back, give ’em back.” And I wouldn’t. That’s basically it. 
   
 Trust violation He asked if he could borrow some money for lunch, and I 
said I didn’t have any. Then later, he saw me buying a 
cookie, and he was all hurt that I lied to him. 
   
Reasons and explanations  
 Intending the harm I said some mean words about Pricilla. She was standing 
right there and heard us. But we kind of wanted to make 
her feel bad. 
   
 Not intending the harm She asked me if I liked her pants, and I said that pink 
wasn’t my favorite color. I didn’t really mean to hurt her 
feelings. 
   
 Benevolent intentions Melissa told me that she knew that Allie had been making 
out with this guy. I didn’t want the secret to get out, so I 
told Allie that Melissa said that. Melissa got pretty upset 
with me and was like, “you weren’t supposed to tell.” 
 





Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
Narrative elements,  
and their types 
 
Examples 
 Incidental reasons My friend took my phone, and I was like, “give it back”. 
He wouldn’t, so I hit him and he got really upset. I didn’t 
think that it was my fault because he invaded my privacy. 
   
 Not self-monitoring I broke his family’s valuable wooden statue. I was just 
being careless, and when I’m in somebody else’s house, I 
should be more careful of what I’m doing.  
   
 Situational constraints My friend wanted me to come to his friend’s surprise 
party, but it was really snowy. My parents told me that I 
couldn’t go cause it was a snowstorm. I didn’t have a 
choice cause my parents said so, and we might have 
crashed. 
   
 Victim’s misconstrual She thought that I’d been ignoring her, but I didn’t think 
that I was. She called me and said that she was really 
upset, but I actually think that I didn’t do anything wrong. 
   
 Numb construction I promised my friend Jenny that I would play with her, but 
then I ditched Jenny and played with someone else.  
   
 Victim hurt him/herself My friend was taking the trash out and he had two big 
bags. He stepped on his skateboard and broke his arm.  
   
 Fragmented 
construction 
She came over, and she knocked it out the rest of the door, 
and she gave it all the way downstairs. And we said, “no, 
don’t.” That was before we met her. 
   
Guilt  
 I said mean things to her, and I really felt bad about it 
since it made her feel bad. I didn’t know what to do after 
that, and I really felt bad. I really thought it was my fault 
that she felt sad. 





Preliminary analyses indicated that none of the main effects or interactions 
involving gender were significant; gender was therefore dropped from subsequent 
analyses. Order was not included in the analyses since it was counterbalanced within age 
and gender. Analyses of narrative length, type of harmful behavior, type of 
reasons/explanations, guilt, and judgments were conducted as a function of event type 
(assume, mitigate) and age (5-, 9-, and 16-year-olds), with event type as a repeated 
measure. For each significant omnibus effect, effect size is reported as partial eta-squared 
(!p2). Bonferroni corrections (with an alpha level of p < .05) were used for all post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons. Degrees of freedom vary as a function of occasional missing data.  
Although analyses were often based on dichotomous data, ANOVA-based 
procedures were used because they have been shown to be more appropriate for 
analyzing this type of data than are loglinear-based procedures, as the latter run into a 




Children’s narratives varied from 4 to 116 clauses; on average, they contained 27 
clauses. An Event Type X Age ANOVA with number of clauses as the dependent 
variable revealed an effect of event type, F (1, 117) = 5.09, p = .026, Wilks’ ! = .96, !p2 
= .04. Assume narratives (M = 25.82, SE = 1.53) had fewer clauses than mitigate 





117) = 9.99, p < .001, !p2 = .15, with the narratives of 5-year-olds including fewer clauses 
(M = 19.19, SE = 2.42) than those of 9- and 16- year-olds (M = 27.90, SE = 2.42 and M = 




Types of harmful behavior 
Given that some children reported engaging in multiple types of harmful 
behaviors, narratives could include multiple categories of harm; 10% of children referred 
to more than one type of harmful behavior (M number of types = 1.13, SD = .38, range = 
1 – 4, mode = 1). The number of different types of harmful acts referenced in any one 
narrative did not significantly vary between assumption (M = 1.18) and mitigation (M = 
1.08) accounts. Similarly, the number of types of harmful behavior that children referred 
to did not vary as a function of their age (Ms = 1.10, 1.15, and 1.13 for 5-, 9-, and 16-
year-olds, respectively).  
The most common types of harmful actions were offensive behavior (25% of 
narratives) and physical harm (25%). The other types of harmful behaviors (i.e., blocked 
goal, exclusion, property harm, trust violation) were each referenced in 11 to 15% of the 
narratives. These six types of harmful acts were analyzed using an Event Type X Age 
MANOVA, and the analysis revealed significant multivariate effects for event type, F (6, 
112) = 4.52, p < .001, Wilks’ ! = .81, !p2 = .20, age, F (12, 224) = 4.16, p < .001, Wilks’ 
! = .67, !p2 = .18, and the event type by age interaction, F (12, 224) = 1.90, p = .036, 
Wilks’ ! = .82, !p2 = .09. The proportion of narratives (by event type and age) in which 





Four out of the six types of harmful actions were equally likely to occur with 
assumption and mitigation of fault. Specifically, 11% to 12% of the narratives referred to 
blocked goals, with assumption and mitigation, respectively. Trust violations were 
referred to in 13% of assumption narratives and in 15% of mitigation narratives. 
Exclusionary behavior was equally likely to occur with assumption (15%) and mitigation 
(13%), as well as physical forms of harm: in 24% and 26% of assumption and mitigation 
accounts, respectively. Follow-up ANOVAs revealed effects of event type on property-
related harm, F (1, 117) = 4.04, p = .047, !p2 = .03. Children were significantly more 
likely to reference property-related harm with assumption (19%) than with mitigation 
(10%). Additionally, they were more likely to reference offensive behavior with 
assumption (33%) than with mitigation (17%), but this main effect was qualified by an 
interaction (see below).  
 The types of harmful behavior that were most frequently discussed by 5-year-olds 
were physical harm (28%) and property-related harm (23%). For 9-year-olds, the most 
frequent types of harming were physical harm (31%) and offensive behavior (25%), and 
for 16-year-olds, the most frequent types of harming were trust violations (39%) and 
offensive behavior (34%). Follow-up ANOVAs revealed age effects for property harm, F 
(2, 117) = 3.48, p = .034, !p2 = .06, and trust violations, F (2, 117) = 15.06, p < .001, !p2 
= .21. Property-related harms occurred more frequently among 5-year-olds (M = .23) than 
16-year-olds (M = .09), with 11-year-olds not significantly different from either group (M 
= .13). Finally, harm resulting from trust violations was more frequent among 16-year-
olds (M = .30, SE = .04) than among 5-year-olds (M = .04, SE = .04) and 9-year-olds (M 





 Follow-up ANOVAs revealed an event type by age interaction for offensive 
behavior, F (2, 117) = 3.86, p = .024, !p2 = .06, and excluding, F (2, 117) = 5.27, p = 
.006, !p2 = .08. Follow-up t-tests revealed that 5-year-olds were equally likely to include 
references to offensive behavior with assumption (M = .15) and mitigation (M = .18). In 
contrast, 9- and 16-year-olds were more likely to include references to offensive behavior 
in their assume accounts (Ms = .35 and .50, respectively) than in their mitigate accounts 
(Ms = .15 and .18, respectively). Five-year-olds were more likely to include references to 
excluding in their assume accounts (M = .20) than in their mitigate accounts (M = .03), 
whereas 9- and 16-year-olds referenced excluding equally frequently with assumption 
(Ms = .18 and .08, respectively) and mitigation (Ms = .18 and .20, respectively). Post-hoc 
t-tests results are presented in Table 2.   
 
Types of reasons and explanations 
 
Similar to harmful acts, participants could refer to multiple reasons and 
explanations for harming; 35% of narratives included references to more than one type of 
reasons and explanations (M number of types = 1.63, SD = .77, range = 1 – 4, mode = 1). 
The number of different types of reasons and explanations referenced in any one 
narrative did not vary with assumption (M = 1.65) and mitigation (M = 1.61). With age, 
children referred to more types of reasons and explanations (Ms = 1.22, 1.72, and 1.79 for 
5-, 9-, and 16-year-olds, respectively).  
The types of reasons and explanations that were referred to most frequently were 
incidental reasons (32% of narratives), not intending the harm (25%), situational 
constraints (20%), not self-monitoring (20%), and victim’s misconstrual (19%). 





(7%), intending the harm (4%), or having benevolent intentions (4%). The remaining 
code, numb construction, was referred to in 11% of the narratives.  
The Event Type X Age MANOVA with the nine types of reasons and 
explanations as dependent variables revealed significant multivariate effects for event 
type, F (9, 109) = 11.80, p < .001, Wilks’ ! = .51, !p2 = .49, age, F (18, 218) = 6.97, p < 
.001, Wilks’ ! = .40, !p2 = .37, and an event type by age interaction, F (18, 218) = 4.36, 
p < .001, Wilks’ ! = .54, !p2 = .27. The proportion of narratives (by event type and age) 
in which each type of reason or explanation was present is given in Table 3. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, the codes that were referenced most frequently (i.e., 
incidental reasons, not intending the harm, and situational constraints) were not found to 
differ between assumption and mitigation of harm. Follow-up ANOVAs revealed effects 
of event type for intending the harmful consequence to the victim, F (1, 117) = 8.49, p = 
.004, !p2 = .07 and numb construction, F (1, 117) = 7.61, p = .007, !p2 = .06. As 
hypothesized, references to intending the harmful consequence to the victim were present 
in assume fault accounts (M = .08) more often than in mitigate fault accounts (M = .01), 
although references in both types of experiences were infrequent. Also as expected, numb 
constructions were also formed more often with assumption (M = .16) than with 
mitigation (M = .06). Main effects of event type on victim’s misconstrual, victim hurt 
self, and not self-monitoring were qualified by an interaction (see below).  
Follow-up ANOVAs revealed age effects for eight of the nine codes: not 
intending the harmful consequences to the victim, F (2, 117) = 4.43, p = .014, !p2 = .07, 
benevolent intentions, F (2, 117) = 5.93, p = .004, !p2 = .09, incidental reasons for 





constraints, F (2, 117) = 11.10, p < .001, !p2 = .16, and numb constructions, F (2, 117) = 
10.82, p < .001, !p2 = .16. Main effects of age on victim’s misconstrual, not self-
monitoring, and victim hurt self were qualified by an interaction (see below). T-tests 
revealed that not intending the harmful consequences to the victim was significantly more 
likely among 9-year-olds (M = .34) than 5-year-olds (M = .15), with 16-year-olds not 
significantly different from either group (M = .25). Benevolent intentions were more 
likely among 16-year-olds (M = .10) than 9-year-olds (M = .01) and 5-year-olds (M = 
.00). Incidental reasons were more frequent among 16-year-olds (M = .41) than 5-year-
olds (M = .21), with 9-year-olds not significantly different from either group (M = .33). 
Situational constraints were more frequent among 9-year-olds (M = .33) and 16-year-olds 
(M = .21) than 5-year-olds (M = .06). In contrast, numb constructions were more frequent 
among 5-year-olds (M = .24) than 9-year-olds (M = .06) and 16-year-olds (M = .03). 
References to intending the harmful action were equally infrequent across the three age 
groups.  
Main effects of event type and age were qualified by an event type by age 
interaction on victim’s misconstrual of the experience, F (2, 117) = 6.03, p = .003, !p2 = 
.09, not self-monitoring, F (2, 117) = 22.19, p < .001, !p2 = .28, and victim hurt self, F (2, 
117) = 11.73, p < .001, !p2 = .17. As expected, follow-up t-tests revealed that 5-year-olds 
equally infrequently included references to the victim’s misconstrual in their assume (M 
= .05) and mitigate (M = .00) accounts; whereas 9- and 16-year-olds referenced the 
victim’s misconstrual more frequently with mitigation (Ms = .45 and .38, respectively) 
than with assumption (Ms = .15 and .13, respectively). Five-year-olds almost never 





9- and 16-year-olds referred to not self-monitoring more frequently with assumption (Ms 
= .30 and .70, respectively) than with mitigation (Ms = .05 and .08, respectively). 
References to the victim hurting herself/himself were more frequent with mitigation for 
5-year-olds (M = .33) than with assumption (M = .00); 9- and 16-year-olds infrequently 
referenced this code in both of their assume (Ms = .00 for each, respectively) and mitigate 
(Ms = .08 and .00, respectively) accounts. Post-hoc t-tests results are presented in Table 




Children referenced guilt in 16% of their narratives. An Event Type X Age 
ANOVA with guilt as the dependent variable revealed effects of event type, F (1, 117) = 
26.68, p < .001, Wilks’ ! = .81, !p2 = .19, age, F (2, 117) = 5.24, p = .007, !p2 = .08, and 
an event type by age interaction, F (2, 117) = 3.95, p = .022, Wilks’ ! = .94, !p2 = .06. 
As we hypothesized, 5-year-olds were equally unlikely to describe guilt in both 
experiences of assumption (M = .08) and mitigation (M = .03); whereas, 9- and 16-year-
olds were more likely to describe guilt in experiences in which they assumed blame (Ms 
= .35 for 9- and 16-year-olds each, respectively) than in those in which they mitigated 
blame (Ms = .05 for 9- and 16-year-olds each, respectively).  
 
Judgments of harmful behavior 
 
Recall that children judged their harmful behavior on a scale ranging from really 
negative (1) to really positive (5). On average, children judged their actions to be between 
kind of negative and mixed/both negative and positive (M = 2.42). An Event Type X Age 





(1, 116) = 77.85, p < .001, Wilks’ ! = .60, !p2 = .40, and an event type by age 
interaction, F (1, 116) = 4.24, p = .017, Wilks’ ! = .93, !p2 = .07. Overall, children judged 
their behavior as more negative with assumption of fault (M = 1.85) than with mitigation 
of fault (M = 2.99). However, the difference between the two experiences was larger for 











































Note. The numbers in each cell represent the proportion of narratives (by event type and age) in which each type of harmful 
action was present. Mean proportions in each row are labeled with different subscripts when the omnibus interaction was 
significant and posthoc Bonferroni tests revealed significant simple effects of event type at p < .05. Proportions within a 




 5-year-olds  9-year-olds  16-year-olds  
 Assume  Mitigate  Assume  Mitigate  Assume  Mitigate  
Blocked goal .10 .10 .15  .15 .08 .10 
(SE) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Excluding .20a .03b .18 .18 .08 .20 
(SE) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) 
Offensive behavior .15 .18 .35a .15b .50a .18b 
(SE) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.06) 
Physical harm .25 .30 .35 .28 .13 .20 
(SE) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
Property-related .33 .13 .13 .13 .13 .05 
(SE) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) 
Trust violation .03 .05 .10 .08 .28 .33 






Table 3  
Types of reasons and explanations, by Event Type and Age (Proportions) 
 
 
Note. The numbers in each cell represent the proportion of narratives (by event type and age) in which each type of reason or 
explanation was present. Mean proportions in each row are labeled with different subscripts when the omnibus interaction was 
significant and posthoc Bonferroni tests revealed significant simple effects of event type at p < .05. Proportions within a 
column may sum to greater than 1.0 because it was possible for multiple categories to be coded for the same narrative. 
 5-year-olds  9-year-olds  16-year-olds  
 Assume  Mitigate  Assume  Mitigate  Assume  Mitigate  
Intending .03  .00  .10 .00 .10  .03  
(SE) (.04) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.04) (.01) 
Not intending .10  .20  .33  .35 .23  .28  
(SE) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.07) 
Benevolent intentions .00  .00 .00 .03 .08 .13 
(SE) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) 
Incidental reasons .23  .20  .28  .38  .35 .48  
(SE) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
Not self-monitoring .03  .03  .30a  .05b  .70a  .08b  
(SE) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.04) 
Situational constraints .13  .00  .30  .35  .18  .25 
(SE) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Victim’s misconstrual .05  .00  .15a  .45b  .13a  .38b  
(SE) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) 
Numb construction .33 .15 .10  .03 .05  .00  
(SE) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.04) 
Victim hurt self .00a  .33b  .00  .08  .00  .00  






In this study, we asked whether, and if so, how two types of children’s own 
transgressive situations (those in which they assume fault for causing harm and those in 
which they mitigate fault for causing harm) offer distinct contributions to children’s sense 
of themselves as moral agents. Specifically, we were examining two features of their 
experiences that were implicated in the construction of moral agency: the types of 
reasons and explanations that children provide to explain their harmful behavior and their 
references to guilt. We also coded the type of harmful behavior that children engaged in 
and their judgments of their behavior to learn more about the background of children’s 
experiences in which they assume and mitigate fault. In general, the findings indicated 
that experiences of assumption and mitigation contribute to children’s development of 
moral agency in some similar ways and in some distinct ways. Moreover, many of the 
differences we found between these two types of transgressive experiences were qualified 
by an interaction with age. In other words, the difference between assumption and 
mitigation appeared to be different for 5-year-olds than it was for 9- and 16-year-olds. 
Excepting two types of harmful actions (property-related harm and offensive 
behavior), children referenced similar types of behaviors with assumption and mitigation 
of fault. Property-related harm (e.g., disputes about sharing, using someone’s belongings 
without permission, damaging someone’s property) and offensive behavior (e.g., name 





assumption of blame, perhaps due to features of the behaviors themselves (e.g., 
ruthlessness, more concrete consequences). However, in general, children discussed 
similar types of behavior with assumption and mitigation of fault. Similarly, although 
children judged their behavior as more negative with assumption than with mitigation, 
across both types of events, children rated their behavior as falling somewhere between 
negative and mixed (simultaneously negative and positive).  
It is against this backdrop of similarities that we interpret the reasons and 
emotions that children provided to explain their harmful behavior in experiences of 
assumption and mitigation of blame for their wrongdoings. We expected that children 
would reference two types of reasons and explanations more frequently with the 
assumption of fault (intending and numb), and five types of reasons and explanations 
more frequently with the mitigation of fault (not intending, benevolent intentions, 
incidental reasons, situational constraints, and victim’s misconstrual). We were unsure 
about whether one type of reason (not self-monitoring) would occur more frequently with 
assumption or mitigation, and we did not anticipate two types of constructions (victim 
hurt self and fragmented) would occur at the onset of the study.  
 
The construction of moral agency with assumption of blame 
 
We found that our hypotheses about the reasons and explanations that would 
occur with assumption of fault were supported by our data. Children were more likely to 
reference intending the harmful consequences or to form numb constructions with 
assumption of fault than they were with the mitigation of fault. There are two caveats to 
these findings: first, intending the harmful consequences was referenced infrequently 





all ages formed numb accounts more frequently with assumption than with mitigation, 
the difference between assumption and mitigation was only significant for children in the 
youngest age group. 
Five-year-olds constructed numb accounts twice as frequently with assumption 
than with mitigation of blame. This is consistent with prior work that suggests that numb 
constructions are formed in situations in which children are overwhelmed by feelings of 
guilt (Wainryb, 2011). It may be that with the assumption of blame, young children are 
struggling to regulate their feelings of guilt, and they are unable to consider why they 
engaged in the harmful behavior. For example, the following assume blame narrative was 
coded as numb. 
Um, one time I didn’t share with someone. They got upset. CAN YOU TELL ME 
EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED? He, he got mad. SO YOU DIDN’T 
SHARE, AND HE GOT MAD? Sometimes I did, but one time I didn’t. He got 
hurt. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU CAN TELL ME ABOUT 
THAT TIME? NO? CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT 
HOW YOU THINK THAT WHAT HAPPENED WAS YOUR FAULT? Because 
I wasn’t sharing. (5-year-old boy)  
 
This narrator referred to his behavior that caused harm (not sharing), and the negative 
emotional consequences of that behavior (he got mad), but he does not provide any 
reasons or explanations for his action—we are not given any information about why he 
did not share. In fact, he seems somewhat fixated on his behavior and the harm that 
ensued from his actions.  
Prior research implies that children should assume responsibility for their 
wrongdoings (e.g., Bandura, 2002), and other work argues that the consideration of 
reasons and explanations is conducive to adaptive moral development (Pasupathi & 





given that when 5-year-olds are asked to construct narrative accounts of situations in 
which they assume fault for causing harm, they often fail to reference their reasons for 
engaging in harm. So, it might not be adaptive to press young children to assume fault for 
hurting others without helping them to consider how their behavior was connected to 
their intentions, goals, emotions, desires, or situational features. 
These findings do not provide an answer as to why older children and adolescents 
did not form numb accounts more frequently with assumption of fault. One possible 
interpretation is that older children and adolescents are better able to regulate their 
feelings of guilt and shame than younger children in situations in which they assume 
blame. However, this speculation appears to be somewhat at odds with the finding that 9- 
and 16-year-olds referenced guilt significantly more frequently with assumption than 
with mitigation, whereas 5-year-olds referred to guilt equally infrequently with both types 
of experiences. Perhaps the process of labeling and discussing their feelings of guilt is in 
and of itself one way in which older children and adolescents are, in fact, regulating their 
emotions. By stating that they feel bad about causing harm, they might be acknowledging 
their wrongdoing and simultaneously preserving some sense of themselves as “good” 
people (i.e., “bad” people would not likely feel guilt for hurting others). Thus, in their 
experiences in which they assume blame, 9- and 16-year-olds might feel guilty, but not 
be overwhelmed by this emotion. This interpretation is consistent with our finding that 9- 
and 16-year-olds often provide reasons to explain their harmful behavior with assumption 
of fault.  
Thirty percent of 9-year-olds’ and 70% of 16-year-olds’ assumption of fault 





mitigation narratives contained this type of reason. This suggests that with assumption of 
fault, children and adolescents are learning about what aspects of their moral agency they 
failed to control (e.g., their attention), but they think that they ought to have controlled. 
Importantly, this type of explanation might allow children to be more forgiving of 
themselves and to imagine a future in which they can make better decisions. By contrast, 
some types of reasons and explanations (e.g., causing intentional harm) likely present 
more of a challenge to children’s relationships with others and their sense of themselves 
as moral beings. 
 
The construction of moral agency with mitigation of blame 
 
 Young children appear to have difficulties mitigating fault for causing harm. 
When they were asked to provide accounts of times “when you did or said something, 
another kid ended up upset or hurt, and you think that it was not your fault,” they often 
narrated experiences that only met the last two criteria. In one-third of their accounts of 
mitigation, 5-year-olds discussed an experience in which the victim hurt herself or was 
hurt by someone else; these types of accounts were presented even after the interviewer 
repeatedly prompted them to describe an event in which they engaged in a behavior that 
ended up causing harm. The finding that young children often narrate a “victim hurt self” 
account with mitigation suggests that when harm ensues from young children’s actions, 
they automatically or reflexively think that it is their fault—if their action caused harm, 
regardless of their reasons for engaging in the action, they tend to consider that it is their 
fault. These findings are consistent with prior work that has shown that young children 
tend to over-attribute intentionality or conflate outcomes and intentions (Wainryb & 





children learn how to mitigate fault for their own harmful actions. Eight percent of 9-
year-olds also constructed “victim hurt self” accounts with mitigation, but more 
frequently, children in this middle age group referenced reasons that were similar to those 
used by 16-year-olds in their accounts of mitigation. 
Five types of reasons and explanations were hypothesized to be referenced more 
frequently with mitigation: not intending the harmful consequences to the victim, 
benevolent intentions, incidental reasons, situational constraints, and the victim 
misconstruing the experience. Only references to the victim misconstruing the experience 
occurred more frequently with mitigation of fault, and this effect was driven by the 9- and 
16-year-olds. This finding suggests that with mitigation of blame, older children and 
adolescents are learning about how their moral agency comes into conflict with the 
agency of others. Thus, they might be learning about the limits of their moral agency and 
that in some experiences, it is difficult or impossible to foresee how others will interpret 
the situation. In this way, children and adolescents are constructing both their own moral 
agency and the agency of others in their experiences of mitigation. Consider the 
following example, which is a fairly typical account of an instance in which the narrator 
mitigates fault for causing harm. References to the victim’s misconstrual of the 
experience (according to the narrator) are bolded: 
[…] So I was with one of my friends, and I asked, and she wasn’t really looking 
at me, but I asked if I could, um, maybe like take, um, have something, bring it 
um somewhere and then bring it right back to her. I think it might have been like a 
stuffed animal or something. And she thought that I stole it, and, and, and she 
thought that she didn’t give me permission, and I thought it wasn’t my fault. 
But I can’t remember much about that, so. She thought that I stole it even after I 
asked […] SO SHE THOUGHT THAT YOU STOLE IT? Mm hmm. Cause she 
wasn’t really looking at me […] AND CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE BIT 
MORE ABOUT HOW  YOU THINK THAT WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN 





asked permission she said yes, and she didn’t hear me, so it’s just a 
misunderstanding. But that when she got mad at me, it was not my fault, cause I 
got permission to take it and bring it back. (9-year-old girl) 
 
In this account, the narrator constructs both the victim’s agency and her own 
agency; she attempts to make sense of the victim’s behavior by considering how the 
victim’s beliefs differed from her own (“she thought…I thought…”). Thus, with 
mitigation, older children and adolescents appear to be learning that it is sometimes 
difficult to guess how others construe their interactions, and because of this imperfect 
understanding of others’ thoughts, desires, and emotions, harming others might be 
inevitable and, perhaps, understandable. Instead of constructing self-protective distortions 
of experiences in which they mitigate fault, children seem to be constructing a realistic 
sense of the limits of their own moral agency with these types of experiences. It is also 
important to note that the narrator does not seem to imply that the victim is exclusively to 
blame for the misunderstanding, but rather she suggests that there is some legitimacy in 
her perspective (“she wasn’t really looking at me; she didn’t hear me”).  
Surprisingly, unintentional harming, benevolent intentions, incidental reasons, 
and situational constraints were not used significantly more frequently with mitigation. 
This contrasts with previous research, which has shown that children and adolescents 
judge hypothetical actors to be blameless or to deserve only part of the blame when they 
hurt others in situations with these sorts of competing concerns. However, there may be a 
few explanations for why our findings may be discrepant from those found in prior work.  
First, it might be that particular types of reasons and explanations might often co-
occur in the same narrative; perhaps children reference unintentional harm, incidental 





of reasons (e.g., not self-monitoring; victim’s misconstrual) that distinguish assumption 
and mitigation. In the present study, we did not examine which types of reasons and 
explanations tended to co-occur. Future research should explore the pattern of types of 
reasons referenced with assumption and mitigation of fault. 
Second, it may also be that coding the presence of different types of reasons did 
not fully capture how children were distinguishing experiences of assumption and 
mitigation via their reasons. It is possible that children elaborated some types of 
explanations in one of their narratives and then only minimally referenced those 
explanations in the other narrative. With our coding scheme, both narratives would be 
given the same code, regardless of the extent to which children elaborated their reference. 
This suggests that further research should examine the frequency of references to each 
type of reason with assumption and mitigation of blame. 
Third, some of these codes encompassed a variety of subcodes, and it might be 
that these subcodes were used differentially with assumption and mitigation of blame. 
For example, the code situational constraints included references to parental authority 
(“She was upset that I wouldn’t talk to her, but my mom said that I was grounded and 
couldn’t be on the phone”), environmental constraints (“I couldn’t drive to the party he 
wanted me to go to because it was snowing”), federal laws (“It was against the law to 
wear an Obama t-shirt on election day, so I told her that”), and peer pressure or group 
dynamics (“Well a lot of us kids thought it was wrong to watch R-rated movies, so we all 
told them to stop it”). The subtypes of these reasons might be differentially associated 





To illustrate these possibilities, consider the following two narratives from the 
same adolescent. The first account was provided when she was asked to talk about an 
experience that was not her fault (mitigate responsibility): 
Um, last year at my old school, I had—so it was like the four of us and we were 
like all best friends and it was my friend Karen, Chelsea, and Megan, and I, and 
um so Karen and Chelsea are really loud, I, like we’re all sort of the same 
personality sort of except for Megan, she’s a little bit quieter. So Megan would 
like say things to me, like about how Chelsea and Karen were really bad 
influences on her and she wished they didn’t swear so much and that they just do 
a lot of bad stuff. Because, um, Karen and Chelsea would take things from the lost 
and found (laughs while talking) and just like act like it was theirs. And Megan 
was like, “I just feel bad cause that’s stealing; they shouldn’t do that,” and I was 
just like, “Oh okay.” And, um, that day I told Karen and Chelsea what Megan 
said, and they got really mad, and they didn’t want to be her friend anymore. So 
they started like pushing her away. And then Megan like got really upset and 
started crying. She called me and asked me why I told them that. And I was just, I 
didn’t really think it was my fault at all (talks louder), and I just said, “Cause you 
shouldn’t be saying that about your friends,” and then she was just really 
upset, and she was crying and I didn’t really know what to do. And so we stopped 
being her friend for a long while and yeah that’s kind of what happened (laughs 
nervously) […] CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT WHY 
YOU THINK THAT THAT TIME WAS NOT YOUR FAULT? Um, I just felt 
that it wasn’t right for her to say things like that if she was their friend. She 
should’ve not have told me, but told them how it made her uncomfortable if 
they swore so much and like taking things from the lost and found. And I 
just didn’t think it was right for her to say it to me. (16-year-old girl) 
 
The bolded parts of this narrative were coded as referring to the narrator’s incidental 
reasons. The narrator explains that she violated Megan’s trust because of her prescriptive 
belief about what friends should do if they disagree with each other, and she elaborates 
on this explanation in detail.  
The same narrator also refers to incidental reasons (and some other types of 
explanations) in her account of an experience in which she assumes fault for causing 
harm: 
So I think it was fifth grade, um, we would take these spelling tests […] like we’d 





[the teacher] would read off the list, and then she would read the words and then 
we’d spell it […] and I (emphasis) thought I was so clever, and I figured out a 
way that if you wrote down the answers, like wrote down each spelling word, and 
then like during the tests when she said them, you just did it, like just wing it, and 
then like after when you have to pass it, you pass it to like the next person in front 
of you to correct it. Instead of giving them the one you were doing, you pull out a 
one you did before—like you wrote down the right ones, and then like give it to 
the person so you have like a hundred percent. MM HMM. So I did that, and I 
told my friend Bree like, “Oh this is such a clever way of like ace-ing this,” (high 
voice) and then she was like, “Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah” (supportive voice). And so 
she started doing it too, and she told her friend Anna, and I didn’t like Anna at 
the time (whispers, laughs while talking). And I was kind of mad because then 
Anna would be getting a good score also. And so I stopped doing it, I don’t know 
why I stopped doing it, I just did. And Anna and Bree were still doing it. So one 
day I was talking to my friend Ginger, and I said, “Oh! They’re cheating!” And so 
we went and told the teacher that they were cheating, and how they were cheating, 
and they both got into a lot of trouble. And Bree was really sad and mad at me 
for—well, she never found out that I told on her. She just thought that someone 
told. And yeah, it was my fault for her getting in trouble (laughs nervously while 
talking). MM HMM. And I still feel bad to this day, and yeah. IS THERE 
ANYTHING ELSE YOU CAN TELL ME ABOUT THAT TIME TO HELP ME 
UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN YOU AND BREE? Yeah. 
Um, not really, we were like really—it was in that moment when you’re not really 
fully best friends, but almost there, and I suppose I was a bit jealous of her and 
Anna’s relationship because they were, they’ve been friends ever since like 
first grade and yeah, I was just kind of upset. AND CAN YOU TELL ME A 
LITTLE BIT MORE ABOUT HOW YOU THINK THAT WHAT HAPPENED 
THAT TIME WAS YOUR FAULT? I feel like I was being really selfish, and 
instead of telling them personally, “Oh let’s not do that anymore,” I wanted 
them to get in trouble. And I’m the one that showed them how to do it, and like 
not even owning up to the fact that I did it before too, but just pushing them 
under the bus. MM HMM. Yeah (sighs). (16-year-old girl) 
 
This second account—her assume fault account—was coded as referencing incidental 
reasons (“I didn’t like Anna; I was a bit jealous), intentional harm (“I wanted them to get 
in trouble”), and not self-monitoring (“I was being really selfish instead of telling 
them…”). Both her mitigate and assume accounts reference incidental reasons, but the 
account in which she assumes blame also contains references to other types of reasons 
and explanations. With mitigation, the narrator elaborated on incidental reasons in more 





mitigation might be classified into a subtype of prescriptive beliefs, whereas the 
incidental reasons that she referenced  with assumption (being mad and jealous) might be 
classified into a different subtype of incidental reasons (e.g., emotions). So, future studies 
should examine the possible subtypes of incidental reasons or situational constraints that 
children reference with assumption and mitigation in order to find whether children are 
constructing similar or distinct aspects of their moral agency vis-à-vis these explanations 




By summary, we found that 5-year-olds most frequently constructed numb 
accounts with assumption of blame. Given that research suggests that numb accounts 
might be problematic to the development of moral agency (e.g., Wainryb, 2011), in 
situations in which young children assume fault for their wrongdoings (either when they 
are pressed to do so by others or when they do so on their own), they might need help 
considering why they engaged in the hurtful behavior and in regulating the guilt, shame, 
or regret that might accompany such experiences. When they were asked to mitigate 
blame for their wrongdoings, 5-year-olds frequently constructed accounts in which their 
peers hurt themselves or were hurt by others. Thus, young children might need adult 
scaffolding to recognize and reflect upon situations in which they engaged in an action, 
someone ended up hurt, and it was not their fault.  
With assumption of fault, 9- and 16-year-olds constructed their moral agency 
around their failure to self-monitor and their feelings of guilt; this suggests that they 
acknowledge the harm that ensued from their actions and also learn about how they can 





of fault, 9- and 16-year-olds constructed their moral agency around the victim’s 
misconstrual of the experience. Thus, mitigation appears to be context in which children 
explore how their own moral agency might have limits, in part because people cannot 
always anticipate how others will interpret their shared interactions.  
Additional research is needed to examine which types of reasons and explanations 
often co-occur in children’s and adolescents’ experiences of assumption or mitigation of 
fault, the extent to which children elaborate some types of reasons with either assumption 
or mitigation, and the subtypes of reasons that might be differentially paired with 
assumption or mitigation of blame. Further, future work is also needed to take a closer 
look at the developmental transition that occurs between the age of 5 and 9 years old—
the period in which most children learn how to mitigate fault for acting in a way that 
caused harm—and to find which aspects of children’s moral agency are developing 
between 9 and 16 years old. Furthermore, the mechanisms that contribute to these 
developmental changes should be explored.  
It is also important to note that when people consider their blameworthiness, they 
likely classify experiences as falling somewhere between “fully assume blame” and 
“fully mitigate blame.” In fact, any given experience probably contains aspects that are 
related to people assuming fault and aspects that are related to people mitigating fault. 
Though we elicited accounts that children nominated as assumption or mitigation 
experiences, it was not uncommon for children—most often adolescents—to change their 
mind about their blameworthiness as they narrated their experience. For example, after 
the adolescent cited above constructed her mitigation account about hurting her friend 





asked the manipulation check question (“Can you remind me, did I ask you to tell me 
about a time that was your fault or about a time that was not your fault?”). The participant 
gave the correct response (“not my fault”) and then added: 
Well at the time, I didn’t think it was my fault because it—I was sort of choosing 
over which friends to be loyal to, I, I felt like I should tell them that Megan was 
thinking that way, but then again, I feel like I was breaking the trust between me 
and Megan for going behind her back also and telling them what she said. (16-
year-old girl) 
 
Upon reflection, this adolescent considers both how she may and may not be to blame for 
her hurtful behavior. She also mentions that over time, her thoughts about her 
blameworthiness have changed. Research is needed to capture these complexities—to 
find how children think about experiences in which they both assume and mitigate blame, 
to document the process whereby children come to classify aspects of an experiences as 
“their fault” or “not their fault,” and to chart why and how children sometimes change 
their mind about their blameworthiness.  
Though there is much work to be done, the present study begins to address to 
these important questions. Our findings suggest that being able to both assume fault and 
to mitigate fault for causing harm is critical to the development of an adaptive sense of 
moral agency. These contexts offer complementary opportunities in which children can 
learn to recognize failures of moral agency that ought to have been under their own 
control, as well as those that are less foreseeable. It is also likely that these type of 
experiences jointly contribute to children’s conceptions of themselves as moral people, 
despite the fact that they sometimes act in ways that hurt others; these findings suggest 





assumption of fault, and those that are more self-protective (but still might reflect what 





Order B: Mitigation then Assumption 
 
I’m here because I’m studying how kids/people (and I don’t mean brothers and sisters, I 
mean just kids/people that know each other)–how kids/people sometimes get along with 
each other and how sometimes they say or do something and another kid ends up feeling 
upset or hurt by it. And sometimes it’s their fault and sometimes it’s not their fault. 
 
EVENT A: Now I want to talk to you about some of your own times when you did or 
said something and some other kid ended up feeling upset or hurt. First, I want you to 
think of a time like this when you think that what you did was not your fault. To help 
you think of a time, I have cards that show what other kids/people have talked about, and 
I want you to think about times you’ve done these things. 
• (offensive behavior) Some kids/people talk about times when they said something 
mean or hurtful, and that ended up upsetting or hurting another kid, and they think 
it was not their fault. 
• (physical) Some kids/people talk about times when they hit, slapped, pushed, or 
tripped another kid, and that ended up upsetting or hurting the other kid, and they 
think it was not their fault. 
• (trust violation) Some kids/people talk about times when they broke a promise, 
spread a rumor, or talked about another kid behind their back, and that ended up 
upsetting or hurting the other kid, and they think it was not their fault. 
• (property) Some kids/people talk about times when they took something without 
permission, didn’t share, or broke something that belonged to someone else, and 
that ended up upsetting or hurting the other kid, and they think it was not their 
fault, and  
• (other) Some kids/people talk about times when they did or said something else 
that I couldn’t really draw, and that ended up upsetting or hurting another kid, and 
they think it was not their fault. 
 
Now I want you to think of one of your own times when you did or said something like 
one of these. Once you’ve thought of that time, point to the card that is like what you 
did…Okay, you know I wasn’t there that time, so I need know the whole story of what 
happened. Tell me all the details so I can picture it as though I’d been there. So take a 
minute and make a picture in your mind of everything that happened that time—that time 





think it was not your fault. When you’ve got the entire story, go ahead and begin – start 
by telling me the name of the kid who ended up feeling upset or hurt. 
• Is there anything else you can tell me about that time?  
• Can you tell me a little more about how you think what happened between 
you and (victim) was not your fault?  
 
MANIPULATION CHECK: Thank you, your story really showed me what happened. 
Real quick, can you remind me what I asked you to do? Did I ask you to tell me about a 
time that you think it was your fault or about a time that you think it was not your fault? 
Great. 
 
EVENT B: Okay, remember how I said that kids sometimes think it was their fault and 
they sometimes think it was not their fault? Now I want you to think of another one of 
your own times when you did or said something and some other kid ended up feeling 
upset or hurt, something like what’s shown on one of these cards. But this time, I want 
you to think of a time like this when you think that what you did was your fault.  
• (offensive behavior) Some kids/people talk about times when they said something 
mean or hurtful, and that ended up upsetting or hurting another kid, and they think 
it was their fault. 
• (physical) Some kids/people talk about times when they hit, slapped, pushed, or 
tripped another kid, and that ended up upsetting or hurting the other kid, and they 
think it was their fault. 
• (trust violation) Some kids/people talk about times when they broke a promise, 
spread a rumor, or talked about another kid behind their back, and that ended up 
upsetting or hurting the other kid, and they think it was their fault. 
• (property) Some kids/people talk about times when they took something without 
permission, didn’t share, or broke something that belonged to someone else, and 
that ended up upsetting or hurting the other kid, and they think it was their fault, 
and  
• (other) Some kids/people talk about times when they did or said something else 
that I couldn’t really draw, and that ended up upsetting or hurting another kid, and 
they think it was their fault. 
 
I want you to think of one of your own times when you did or said something like one of 
these. Once you’ve thought of that time, point to the card that is like what you did. It can 
be a different time using the same card or a time using another card…Again, you know I 
wasn’t there that time, so I need know the whole story of what happened. Tell me all the 
details so I can picture it as though I’d been there. So take a minute and make a picture in 
your mind of everything that happened that time—that time when you did or said 
something, and the other kid ended up feeling upset or hurt, and you think it was your 
fault. When you’ve got the entire story, go ahead and begin – start by telling me the 
name of the kid who ended up feeling upset or hurt. 
• Is there anything else you can tell me about that time?  
• Can you tell me a little more about how you think what happened between you 





MANIPULATION CHECK: Thank you, your story really showed me what happened. 
Real quick, can you remind me what I asked you to do? Did I ask you to tell me about a 
time that you think it was not your fault or about a time that you think it was your fault?  
 
JUDGMENT OF EVENT A: Great, thank you for telling me the whole story. So here’s 
what I want us to do now: I want to ask you some questions about that first time you told 
me about—the time when you think it was not your fault. So, when you think about the 
time when you (act) and (victim) felt [upset/hurt], do you think it was okay or not okay 
that you (act)? Do you think it was really (not) okay or just kind of (not) okay? 
1   2   3  4  5 
really not okay kind of not okay mixed/both kind of okay really okay 
 
JUDGMENT OF EVENT B: So here’s what I want us to do now: I want to ask you some 
questions about that other time you told me about—the time when you think it was your 
fault. So, when you think about the time when you (act) and (victim) felt [upset/hurt], do 
you think it was okay or not okay that you (act)? Do you think it was really (not) okay or 
just kind of (not) okay? 
1   2   3  4  5 
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